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CIA PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES AND RELATED INTELLIGENCE 1946-1952
(Tentative Research Outline)

I. Planning Stage to February 1946 (For background information)

SOURCES: Meetings of various bodies having to do with formation of a central intelligence agency; such notes as might be acquired from Montague, Lay, Souers and others having a direct part

II. The Interim Stage: The Reports Staff and Office of Research and Evaluation

A. Planning a coherent organization

B. Recruiting personnel

C. Getting out summaries of current intelligence

SOURCES: Meetings of supervisory bodies; NIA and IAB records; personnel records; files of early current intelligence publications; any records that may exist of transactions within ORE; personal files

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Date 17 Jan 91

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III. ORE Under the Intelligence Staff up to the First Reorganization

- A. Nature of the Contest between the Staff and the Branches
- B. Ambiguous position of Intelligence Staff
- C. Acceptance of Situation Report Series
- D. Recruitment problems
- E. Production during this period
- F. Decisions regarding new Organization

SOURCES: Records probably extant in various parts of R&R and elsewhere; personal records of some of those concerned; meetings of supervisory bodies; Central Records; personnel records; files of ORE publications

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IV. ORE from the First to the Second Reorganization *TO THE DULLES REPORT*

- A. Nature and Effects of First Reorganization
- B. Operations under the Reorganization
- C. The "Bogota Crisis"
- D. Very gradual change of emphasis from Current to Estimate intelligence
- E. Added publications
- F. Problems of initiation---acceptance of questionable projects
- G. Problem of shaping final drafts
- H. Beginning and development of coordination difficulties: attempted remedies
- I. The time factor in producing estimates: attempted remedies
- J. Clashes within ORE
- K. Publications during this period
- L. Impact of the Dulles-Jackson Report

SOURCES: ORE records; Personal files; CIA organization charts; Central Records; internal ORE memoranda; AD and P&P records; correspondence between Staff Intelligence and Agencies; records of coordination meetings; For Bogota affair: newspapers, congressional hearings, and internal records; ORE publications files; Dulles Report plus any records showing reasons for findings; ICAPS records; NSC and DCI directives; relevant material in IAC Agencies if available; the Hoover Report; possible interviews

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V. From the DULLES Report to the Second Reorganization

- A. ORE's deliberations over meaning of Report for ORE
- B. The Rebuttal
- C. Formulation of Reorganization Plans
- D. The "Reitzel Committee" Report and other critical documents
- E. NSC-50
- F. ORE operations and publications during period
- G. Growing conflicts in inter-agency coordination: adoption of sound recordings
- H. Meeting of AD with agency colleagues to improve coordination: the impasse
- I. Announcement of the "Reorganization": its nature
- J. Opposition to reorganization plan; its adoption over opposition

SOURCES: ORE records; DCI and ICAPS records; IAC meetings; NSC records; Agency records if available; recordings of coordination meetings; ORE publication files; records of controversy over dissents; minutes and reports of various committees working with reorganization plans; files of Branch publications; files of miscellaneous publications and IM's

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VI. ORE under the Second Reorganization

- A. Lack of essential change in organization or operation
- B. Functioning of the combined "Publication Division"
- C. Attempts at closer working relations with Agencies
- D. Modifications in Daily and Weekly Summaries
- E. The "Stout Committee" report
- F. Continued prevalence of dissents
- G. CIA concern over intrusion of departmental policy into intelligence
- H. Apparent plans of DCI to control situation
- I. Publications of period
- J. The Korean Crisis: ORE's record with respect to this event

SOURCES: ORE, DCI, and similar records; memoranda on matter of departmental policy; publication files; internal records, newspapers, and congressional hearings having to do with Korea

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VII. The Third Reorganization

- A. Malfunctioning of ORE machinery under impact of Korean Crisis
- B. Resultant creation of AD's Special Staff
- C. Method of selection; composition, and theoretical functions of Staff
- D. Working out of Staff functions in practice
- E. Reason for Staff's relative failure to perform functions
- F. Achievements of Special Staff
- G. Gradual paralysis of Staff as New Order approached
- H. Effects of growing rumors on ORE in general
- I. Establishment of the New Administration

SOURCES: Principally ORE, CIA, and personal files; if possible, records of plans being made on higher levels of CIA and outside CIA for the forthcoming reorganization

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VIII. The New Order

- A. Gradual transition from old to new CIA
- B. Disappearance of ORE and assignment of its functions to OCI, R&R and ONE
- C. Nature and theory of ONE
- D. Period of adjustment in ONE: gradual emergence of definite organization
- E. Organization as crystallized after first year
- F. ONE methods of production and coordination
- G. ONE use of contacts outside CIA and IAC
- H. Achievements of ONE through 1951

SOURCES: ONE and CIA records; ONE publication files; IAC meetings

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